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LATIN AMERICA UPDATE: THE
ENHANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL




I. GUATEMALA'S PUBLIC ORDER LAW AND THE TWO
MONTH SIEGE OF ALTA VERAPAZGUATEMALA has a drug problem. The drug-related violence of
Mexico has spilled over Mexico's southern border into Guate-
mala's northern regions.' As the Mexican government increases
pressure on drug cartels within its own borders, the cartels are fleeing
south to Guatemala. 2 At stake are valuable drug smuggling routes that
connect South American drug sources to the United States.3 Among
these cartels is Los Zetas, one of Mexico's most feared drug cartels, who
has already set up camps in the northern regions of Guatemala.4
Following Mexican President Felipe Calderon's aggressive crackdown
on drug cartels, governments such as Guatemala's are attempting to rid
their jurisdictions of the cartels and are turning to the United States for
assistance in doing so.5 Guatemalan President Alvoro Colom, for exam-
ple, requested assistance from both the United States and Mexico in
fending off cartels. 6 The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency has already
commenced its support by cracking down on air trafficking of drugs
throughout the region.7 Although this has helped to significantly reduce
air trafficking of drugs into Guatemala, it has only increased the value of
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1. See William Booth & Nick Miroff, Mexican Drug Cartels Draw Guatemalan Army
to Jungles Where it Fought Civil War, WASH. Pos-r, Feb. 10, 2011, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/09/AR201102090691 9.html.
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land trafficking routes through Guatemala.8
Historically, Guatemala has served as a pivotal bridge for the transpor-
tation of drugs, primarily cocaine, from South America to the United
States.9 After arriving from Ecuador and Colombia via the sea, drugs are
transported north by land through Guatemala and Mexico en route to the
consumer base in the United States.' 0 In the midst of a number of these
drug routes exists Guatemala's northern province of Alta Verapaz and its
capital city of Cobin.11 The high importance of transportation routes and
the desire to monopolize these northern bound arteries pits drug cartels
against one another and fosters vicious and bloody turf wars.12 Cur-
rently, the Los Zetas cartel is in a fierce battle with Mexico's Gulf drug
cartel over precious transport routes.' 3 Recently, Los Zetas provided
Guatemalans with a brutal reminder of the viciousness of these battles by
leaving a number of decapitated human heads on the parliament steps.14
In December 2010, President Colom and the Guatemalan government
took dramatic steps to up the stakes in their resistance to these cartels. In
order to combat the Los Zetas cartel, President Colom imposed martial
law in the Alta Verapaz province and deployed the military to the region
to regain control of the area in an attempt to root out the cartel.' 5 But as
Guatemalans quickly discovered, ridding their territory of drug cartels
through such policies will not come without significant costs to their
freedoms.
A. THE Two-MONTH SIEGE OF ALTA VERAPAZ
On December 19, 2010, President Colom declared martial law in the
country's Northern Province of Alta Verapaz after concluding that the
presence of the Los Zetas drug cartel made the area "ungovernable and
lawless."1 6 President Colom's effort to stabilize the region, which he
claimed was authorized by Guatemala's Law of Public Order, was ap-
proved in an emergency legislative session on December 22, 2010.17 On
January 19, 2011 President Colom announced that the siege would be ex-
8. Id.
9. Id.; Griffin, supra note 2.
10. Griffin, supra note 2.
11. Booth & Miroff, supra note 1.
12. Griffin, supra note 2.
13. Id.; The Zetas have already forced at least one other drug cartel out of Guatemala.
Id. The cartel is comprised of former military personnel were initially members of
the Gulf Cartel but later split and formed an independent cartel. See Guatemala
Ends 'Siege' In Drug-Plagued Province, JAKARTA Pos-r, Feb. 19, 2010, http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/02/1 9/guatemala-ends-039siege039-drug-
plagued-province.html.
14. Griffin, supra note 2.
15. Booth & Miroff, supra note 1.
16. Kevin Kearney, Guatemala Escalates Drug War With Declaration of Martial Law,




tended for thirty days, explaining that "more need[ed] to be done." 18
The siege lasted until February 19, 2011, when the government ended
martial law in the region but indicated that the military would remain in
the area.19 The siege extended beyond attempting to curtail drug-related
activity: it also allowed the military to "detain, without judicial oversight,
anyone in the region suspected of 'altering public order' or 'conspiring
against the state." 20 Even further, the law required "that media sources
'avoid publications that contribute to altering the public order.'"21
Drafted in 1965, Guatemala's Public Order Law was originally enacted
to control guerilla tactics in the region.22 The introductory provision of
the law explains that "it is the duty of the authorities to maintain security,
public order and stability of state institutions, which requires certain cir-
cumstances, the restriction that the Constitution guarantees." 2 3 At the
same time, the introduction also contains a guarantee that "in the case of
restriction of constitutional guarantees, [it must be assured]. . .that the
application of appropriate legal action will be in the minimum [extent
necessary]." 24 Chapter one of the law provides that "the law shall apply
in cases of invasion of national territory, serious disturbance of the peace,
public calamity or activities against security." 25
Where conditions warrant the application of martial law, the law pro-
vides the government and military forces a wide array of heightened pow-
ers.2 6 Chief among these enhancements is the right of the government to
restrict individuals' freedom of movement,27 to prevent public meetings
or entertainment,28 to "set minimum or maximum prices for basic neces-
sities," 29 and to "intervene in the functioning of public services and busi-
nesses." 30 The law also dramatically increases the military's powers by
allowing it to, among other things, "intervene or dissolve without need of
prevention or warning, any organization, entity, association, or
group... "31 and "order without warrants or duress, detention or confine-
ment: . . .of anyone suspected of plotting against the established
18. Guatemala Extends Its State of Siege, President Says "Drug Traffickers Have Us
Cornered", HISPANICALLY SPEAKING Nvws, Jan. 19, 2011, http://www.hispanically
speakingnews.com/notitas-de-noticias/details/guatemala-extends-its-state-of-siege-
president-says-drug-traffickers-h/4469/.
19. Guatemala Ends 'Siege' in Drug-Plagued Province, supra note 13.
20. Kearney, supra note 16.
21. Id.
22. Simon Granovsky-Larsen, Martial Law, Repression, and Remilitarization in Guate-
mala, N. AM. CONG. ON LATIN AM., Feb. 17, 2011, https://nacla.org/node/6879.
23. Decreto Numero 7, Ley de Orden Pdblico (1965) (Guat.), available at http://
www.mingob.gob.gt/archivosvarios/Ley-de-Orden-Publico.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Id. ch. I, art. 1.
26. See id.
27. Id. ch. IV, art. 15(2).
28. Id. ch. IV, art. 15(4).
29. Id. ch. IV, art. 15(5).
30. Id. ch. III, art. 13(1).
31. Id. ch V, art. 19(1).
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government. . . ."32
President Colom's action came as a response to the growing presence
of Mexican drug cartels in northern regions of Guatemala.3 3 As a popu-
lar local saying emphasizes, "[o]ur neighbor is cleaning his house, and the
cockroaches are fleeing here."34 Guatemalan Defense Minister Abraham
Valenzuela even referred to the cartels as "narcoterrorists." 35
B. THE EFFECTS OF THE SIEGE ON LOCAL INHABITANTS
Many Guatemalans reacted skeptically to the heightened military pow-
ers by arguing that the siege was nothing more than a front for the gov-
ernment to achieve other ends, primarily to extinguish social reform
efforts mounted by province's relatively poor population.3 6 For example,
some feared that the law was simply a method for the government to
quash land reform efforts of the local residents.37 As evidence of this
contention, two well-known land reform activists within the area were
arrested after the siege was put in place.38
Understanding the history of the relationship between the government
and the inhabitants of this region helps place these fears in context. 39
Many inhabitants of the region fled during the violent conflicts that took
place during the 1970s.40 When they returned, however, their property
had been transformed into a national park, which created tension be-
tween the displaced settlers and the Guatemalan government. 41 The con-
tinued presence of this tension is evidenced by the over 300 agrarian
disputes that currently exist in the region.42
Such reservations about the heightened power were fueled by incidents
such as the one that occurred on February 8, 2011, when a well-known
local activist was "beaten in front of his family" by the military and "de-
tained in a private residence. . .and did not resurface."4 3 Although it was
later discovered that the leader had been imprisoned, officials refused to
acknowledge or provide information on his arrest.44 Prior to this inci-
dent, on January 10, 2011, troops entered another settlement without
warning, discharged weapons in the air, destroyed crops, and stole live-
stock.45 One community member also accused a government official of
32. Id. ch. V, art. 19(2)(a) (emphasis added).
33. Lorne Matalon, Mexico's Drug War Comes to Guatemala, PRI's Tim WORLo, Feb.
10, 2011, http://www.theworld.org/2011/02/10/mexicos-drug-war-comes-to-guate-
mala/; see also Booth & Miroff, supra note 1.











45. See Granovsky-Larsen, supra note 22.
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accompanying the soldiers during an attempted rape.46 Suspicions of
governmental foul play are fueled by the fact that this community is
home to a large number of the land disputes cited above.47 Another com-
munity, Saquimo Setano, which was also involved in a land dispute with a
large landowner, was the subject of an armed attack on January 20,
2011.48 Further, in the nearby town of Izabal, three activists were killed
in February 2011.49 Following the implementation of the siege, the num-
ber of indigenous arrests also drastically increased.50 But, because the
government restricted the ability of the media and the flow of informa-
tion, it is not clear how many other incidents similar to these occurred
during the two-month siege.51
Another report alleges that the government may have implemented the
siege in order to prevent the local groups from meeting in opposition to
dam projects in the region.52 In the months prior to the siege, local com-
munities began assembling in opposition to dams, which were planned
"without the consent of [the] affected Qeqchi communities." 5 3 But the
siege prohibited such meetings and assemblies, and hence, some are scep-
tical that the siege was enacted at least in part as a reaction to these meet-
ings.54 According to one source, the construction of one of these dams
would flood eighteen or more indigenous communities.55 Here again,
painful memories create concern for members of these communities. 56
Dam construction during the late 1970s and early 1980s involved military
evictions that forced local inhabitants from their land.57 Those who
demonstrated and opposed the dam project were met with violent resis-
tance, leading to a number of deaths.58
Others question why the government chose to single out Alta Verapaz
for the siege but left other areas with similar problems unaltered. 59 As
Haroldo Shetemul, a journalist with the local Prensa Libre newspaper,





50. Daisy Johnson, State of Siege in Guatemala, DEFENCE VIEWPOINTS, Feb. 2, 2011,
http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uklarticles-and-analysis/state-of-siege-in-
guatemala.
51. Granovsky-Larsen, supra note 22.
52. Annie Bird, Guatemala: State of Siege, Two Steps Backwards, LATIN AM. Bu-










59. Chris Arsenault, States of Siege Wrack Guatemala, Ai JAZEERA, Jan. 5,2011, http:/
/english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/01/2011141174178915.html.
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region around Guatemala City, the capital." 60 For Shetemul, this calls to
question why Alta Verapaz was the only area chosen for the siege if the
government's objective was really to restore order and security. 61
Although it is still too early to gauge the success of the siege in remov-
ing drug cartels from the region, the results seem mixed. According to
Interior Minister Carlos Manocal, the crime rate decreased by fifty per-
cent during the period of martial law, the number of homicides declined
drastically, and a number of planes and weapons of traffickers were
seized.62 At the same time, however, others point to the lack of Los Ze-
tas arrests and drug-related arrests as indicia of the siege's failure to deter
the cartels. 63 Moreover, it took the government until February 2011 to
arrest their first high ranking member of Los Zetas.64
Corruption and bribery between Los Zetas, the military, and the Gua-
temalan government also makes it difficult to crack down on the cartel.65
In 2009, for example, weapons seized from the Los Zetas cartel were
traced back to the Guatemalan army. 66 In addition, Los Zetas actively
recruits Guatemalan soldiers by offering higher wages than the govern-
ment, a tactic that has proved successful in luring a number of soldiers
into the cartel. 67 Los Zetas has also infiltrated the police force of Alta
Verapaz, leading one government official to conclude that police in the
area were "totally infiltrated by the Zetas." 68
C. CONCLUSION
Although the siege has been lifted, Guatemalans will face a difficult
situation going forward. While the Guatemalan government will likely
continue to take measures to resist the drug cartels, likely with funding
and assistance from the United States and other foreign sources, the siege
that lasted from December 2010 until February 2011 is indicative of the
toll that such measures may take on the country's population. The his-
toric tension between the government and indigenous communities, cou-
pled with corruptive nature of drug cartels such as Los Zetas, creates a
situation ripe with distrust and suspicious motives. The end of the siege
did not represent an end to either the land disputes of the Alta Verapaz
region or of the presence of the Los Zetas cartel in the Guatemala.
Hence, both the drug problem and the vulnerability of indigenous groups
remain an issue in Guatemala and should be monitored going forward.
Furthermore, it will be important for the international community to be
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Luis Angel Sas, Guatemala Ends 'Siege' in Drug-Plagued Province, YAHOO!
NEws, Feb. 18, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110219/ap.on.re_1a_am ca/It_
guatemala state_of siege.
63. Granovsky-Larsen, supra note 22.
64. Id.
65. See Johnson, supra note 50.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Arsenault, supra note 59.
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mindful not only of the drug problem present in Guatemala, but also to
ensure that efforts to rid the country of such drug problems are not pur-
sued at the cost of the livelihood of its inhabitants.
II. VENEZUELA'S CRACKDOWN ON DISSIDENTS AND
RESTRICTION OF PRESS FREEDOMS
A. CHAVEZ'S CRACKDOWN ON DISSIDENTS
A wide variety of Venezuelans, ranging from journalists to political op-
ponents of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, have been victims of the
President's recent crackdown on those who oppose or question his gov-
ernance. 69 The President has now taken action against at least twenty-
four individuals who dissidents contend are being targeted as political
prisoners.70 Other targets of Chavez have fled Venezuela and sought asy-
lum in other countries.71
One of the dissidents who fled Venezuela was Manuel Rosales, who
lost the presidential election to Chavez in 2006.72 Rosales, one of the
President's chief opponents, has sought asylum in Peru.73 Corruption
charges against Rosales, which had previously been abandoned because
of a lack of evidence, were reinstated during a subsequent election pe-
riod. 74 As President Chavez declared, "I am putting myself at the head of
Operation 'Imprison Manuel Rosales." 75
Another target of Chavez is Judge Marfa Lourdes Afiuni, who was de-
tained in December 2009 after allowing the release of another political
prisoner who had been detained without trial for nearly three years.76
The judge, who cited not only Venezuelan law but also a statement by the
United Nations on the individual's detainment when ordering his release,
was jailed in harsh conditions.77 According to El Universal, Afiuni was
also psychologically tortured while in jail.7 8
On another front, others fear that recent legislative measures passed by
the Venezuelan government may further restrict the freedoms of the
press in Venezuela.




72. Carla Salazar, Manuel Rosales, Chavez Critic, Skipped Court, Seeking Asylum,
Now in Peru, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 21, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/04/21/manuel-rosales-chavez-cri n_189547.html.
73. Id.




78. Maria Lourdes Afiuni: Torture and Abuse After Her Globovision Exclusive, EL
PA! omo, Nov. 16, 2010, http://elpalomo.info/2010/11/maria-lourdes-afiuni-torture-
and-abuse-after-her-globovision-exclusive/.
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B. NEW MEDIA LAWS FURTHER RESTRicr PRESS FREEDOMS
In December of 2010, the Venezuelan government passed legislation
that will place further limitations on the media in a country where many
contend the government has already overstepped its bounds in regulating
the press. 79 Two pieces of legislation alter Venezuela's Organic Telecom-
munications Law and the Social Responsibility on Radio and Television
Law.80 The changes make the "use of telecommunications networks.. .a
public service," perhaps to enhance the government's ability to patrol
such media.81 Expanding on limitations implemented in 2004, the
changes bring internet content under the government's scope of regula-
tion and make "webpage managers 'responsible for the information and
content' published on their websites" by requiring them to "now 'estab-
lish mechanisms to restrict, without delay, the diffusion of
messages.. .that are included in the ban." 82 The law "prohibits messages
and images that 'disrespect public authorities,' 'incite or promote hatred'
or crimes, or could create 'anxiety in the citizenry or alter public
order.'"83
Despite the government's touted objective of ensuring social responsi-
bility, a number of sources suspect that the law is aimed at curtailing the
broadcasting reach of its critics, such as Globovision. 84 Chavez's recent
actions have led some to conclude that the President has been looking for
methods to silence his opposition, especially Globovision.85 Criminal
charges were even filed against Globovision's leader, who is currently
seeking asylum in the United States.86 Prior to the passage of the latest
restrictions, the government had already taken control of two companies
that owned approximately twenty-five percent of Globovision's shares.87
As explained by Carlos Laurfa of the Committee to Protect Journalists,
"[t]hese reforms, passed without any debate, are a clear attempt by the
Venezuelan government to further its clampdown on critics and indepen-
79. Christopher Toothaker, NGO: Press Freedoms Threatened in Latin America,
MERCURYNEWS.COM, Feb. 15, 2011, http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/
ci_17394633?nclick check=1.




82. Venezuela Passes Media, Internet-Muzzling Law, PIIYSORG.COM, Dec. 21, 2010,
http://www.physorg.com/news/2010-12-venezuela-media-internet-muzzling-
law.html.
83. Toothaker, supra note 79.
84. See Controversial Media-Law Changes Approved in Venezuela, supra note 80;
Toothaker, supra note 79; Venezuela Passes Media, Internet-Muzzling Law, supra
note 82.
85. See Venezuela Passes Media, Internet-Muzzling Law, supra note 82.
86. Id.
87. State-Controlled Media in Venezuela: A Worrying Trend, MuDIA L. & FREEDOM




Of particular concern is the broad and ambiguous phrasing of the new
laws.89 Sources fear that the use of phrases such as "fomenting anxiety"
and "altering public order" could enable the government to preclude the
broadcast of almost any message critical to its objectives. 90 Overly broad
internet regulations also pose a danger to human rights groups and other
groups who are opposed to the government's position by making it ex-
ceedingly difficult to reach citizens through the internet and to organize
human rights movements.9'
C. CONcLusIoN
Although it is not clear to what degree the government will use these
powers to quash the voices of its opposition, these latest changes re-
present yet another step in the Venezuelan government's recent attempts
to enhance control and regulation of the press in Venezuela. These
changes, combined with the other attempts by the Venezuelan govern-
ment and President Chavez to silence dissidents, will likely continue to
garner international attention going forward.
88. CPJ Condemns Two Venezuelan Media Laws, COMM. -ro PROTE-C JOURNAIUSTS,
Dec. 21, 20310, http.//www.cp).org2012Iep-condemns-two-venezuelan-media-
laws.php.
89. Richard Allen Greene, Critics of Venezuela's New Media Laws Fear 'Dangerous'
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